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Abstract
No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but better educated and
richer voters are on average better informed than others. We develop a model where
the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor
voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the
preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, we find that income is more
important in affecting voting behavior for more informed voters than for less informed
voters, as predicted by the model. Further, in a panel of US states we find that
when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress
representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory.
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1 Introduction
Politics is complex. As voters are time constrained, and aware of the fact that they are
unlikely to be pivotal in large-scale elections, they lack incentives to study all details and
aspects of the political choices ahead. While most voters are therefore imperfectly informed
about politics, the level of political information varies among people.
What are the consequences if some voters are better informed about politics, and thus
better at picking the most suitable political party for themselves? And what happens if this
political knowledge is systematically skewed – i.e. if the better educated – who tend to be
wealthier – are better at choosing their most favorable party? These are the questions we
study in this paper.
In our model, we abandon the usual assumption of perfect information and assume instead
that only a fraction of the voters observe the electoral platforms. The probability that a
given voter observes them is increasing in what we label her political knowledge. Income and
political knowledge are often positively correlated, for instance because the better educated
are both better informed and better paid. This implies that richer voters are on average
better at seeing through political rhetoric and at choosing the best party to implement their
interests.
Further, in our framework voters want more redistribution the lower their income. Par-
ties have political ideal points, but propose platforms that also appeal to as many voters
as possible. Generally, the lower the level of political information, the more the parties
concentrate on their own ideal points as fewer voters grasp their platforms. If information
is unevenly distributed – with rich voters being better informed, however, this tends to pull
both left-wing and right-wing parties towards the preferences of the rich, which in our setting
implies less redistribution.
We test the model’s assumptions and predictions using data from the American National
Election Studies (ANES). First, we confirm that more educated and richer voters are indeed
better informed politically, measured both by self reported interest in politics and by whether
they follow politics and the electoral campaigns in the media.
To explore the predictions on voter behavior, we study how the relationship between
income and voting depends on the level of information. As our model predicts, income is a
better predictor of voting for the better informed voters whereas the voting behavior of the
less well informed voters contains more randomness. To study the effect of the distribution of
information on party behavior, we compare representatives in the House and the Senate from
states and periods where the correlation between income and our measures of information is
high to representatives in other states and periods where this income-information correlation
is low. When there is a strong correlation, the voting patterns of both Republican and
Democrat representatives shift to the right. To the best of our knowledge these are novel
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empirical findings.
Our paper relates to several literatures. The benchmark for our theoretical framework is
based on existing models of electoral competition1, and our results may shed new light on
the so-called “redistribution puzzle”,2 i.e. the robust empirical finding that redistribution
levels are not as high as predicted by these models and that levels of redistribution are lower
rather than higher in more inegalitarian societies.3
There is also a quite extensive theoretical literature on the effect of information on voters’
decisions. It has been argued that the level of voter information does not matter for electoral
outcomes and that uninformed voters can achieve a “full information equivalent” outcome
through cues, information shortcuts and biases cancelling out in aggregation (McKelvey and
Ordeshook, 1985; Wittman, 1989; Lupia, 1992). Also the pivotal voting literature usually
predicts that uninformed voters balance the partisan bias or abstain, assuring in this way
that the same outcome as under full information occurs (cf., for example, Austin-Smith and
Banks, 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996, 1997). In contrast, our theory aims to show
that information does matter for political outcomes.4
These theoretical contributions also contrast with most of the empirical evidence, which
usually finds that uninformed voters do not vote “correctly” (i.e. according to their best
interest), and that lack of information biases voting outcomes (Palfrey and Poole, 1987; Delli
Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Bartels, 1996; Gilens, 2001). There is also an important emerging
literature on the effects of media on politics. Its focus has been on e.g. political turnout
(Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel, 2009), voting outcomes (Della Vigna and Kaplan, 2007;
Gerber et al., 2009), political outcomes (Stro¨mberg 2004a,b), and the relationship between
media markets and political outcomes (Chan and Suen, 2008).
There are a few models of voting under incomplete information in the literature, but
none of them links information to income. Banks (1990) studies conditions under which an
equilibrium exists when voters do not know politicians’ exact positions. Martinelli (2006) and
Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) model the conditions under which rational voters would have
incentives to acquire costly information. Rohner (2009) builds a model with noisy signals,
1Cf. the median voter models of Downsian electoral competition (e.g., Downs, 1957; Romer, 1975;
Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981) and probabilistic voting models (see Lindbeck and Weibull,
1987).
2See for example Perotti (1996) or Moene and Wallerstein (2001, 2003). Lind (2005) provides a survey
of this literature.
3There are also other theoretical arguments and explanations in the literature for why redistribution
levels are relatively low and the poor do not expropriate the rich, including the lower level of political
participation of the poor (Harms and Zink, 2003; Larcinese, 2005), multi-dimensional issue spaces (Roemer,
1998), collective action problems of the poor and interest groups (Olson, 1965), the deadweight loss from
taxation (Meltzer and Richard, 1981), the need for a social hierarchy (Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2000), the
dynamics of perceived social mobility (Piketty, 1995) and the prospects of upward mobility (Hirschman and
Rothschild, 1973).
4A related strand of literature studies how some uninformed voters give special interest groups political
influence through campaign contributions and endorsements (Baron 1994, Grossman and Helpman 1996).
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where in societies with a high proportion of uninformed voters candidates with a low level of
“valence” (i.e. of honesty and competence) have an increased probability of getting elected
into office. Gul and Pesendorfer (2009) emphasize a framework with ignorant voters, where
candidates with a “preferred personality” can gain re-election despite implementing partisan
policies that lead to lower expected payoffs for the electorate.5
The remainder of our contribution is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
model, while Sections 3 and 4 test the model’s predictions with respect to voting behavior
and political outcomes, respectively. Section 5 concludes and the Appendix contains an
extension of the model, data information and supplementary estimations.
2 The Model
2.1 Voters
We consider a unit mass of voters differentiated by income y, where y follows a distribution
with cdf F and density f . There is a government that levies a uniform tax τ which is spent
on redistribution and/or public goods provision. A voter with income y has preferences over
taxes described by the indirect utility function U(τ, y) – typically poorer voters prefer higher
taxes. To assure the existence of a political equilibrium, we impose Assumption 1.
Assumption 1 The preferred tax rate is decreasing in income, and U satisfies Gans and
Smart’s (1996) single crossing property.
Individuals have different levels of political information and knowledge. If information
acquisition has even a small cost, it is implausible that agents acquire it for the sole purpose
of making appropriate party choices, as the probability of being pivotal is minuscule. Still,
one would expect that more educated individuals are better informed. One rationale for
this is that information has a consumption value, but acquisition of information is costly.
If the cost is declining in the level of human capital, this generates a positive correlation
between political knowledge and human capital. As education and income are positively
correlated, this also implies a positive correlation between income and political information.
To summarize:
Assumption 2 Education is both positively related to income and negatively related to the
cost of acquiring political information. Hence, ceteris paribus, rich voters are better informed.
In Appendix A.1 we present a simple model that provides micro foundations for these
two assumptions.
5In Hodler, Loertscher and Rohner (2010) incumbents can manipulate beliefs by implementing inefficient
policies.
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The voters face two parties L and R that both propose a political platform described
by tax policies τL and τR. The parties announce their platforms. However, the likelihood
of receiving this announcement depends on the voter’s political information. To simplify,
we assume that a voter either receives a perfect signal or no signal at all (i.e. a completely
non-informative signal). Formally, a voter gets the informative signal with probability pi (y)
where pi is increasing in y. Voters who do not receive the signal are assumed to be completely
uninformed about the platforms. All our results would be qualitatively unchanged if we
were to allow for uninformed voters having some partial information about platforms, e.g.
obtaining information about the distribution of possible platforms, receiving some noisy
signal of the platforms etc. For expositional ease we maintain here the “sharp” assumption
of uninformed voters having no information about platforms.
To further simplify the model, we assume that uninformed voters have Knightian un-
certainty over the parties’ political positions to avoid the issue of prior beliefs of positions.
Hence uninformed voters cannot condition their party choice on announced policies, and
judge U (τL, y) equal to U (τR, y).
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2.2 Political parties
The two parties L and R care both about winning the elections and about the implemented
policies, following Wittman’s (1983) approach. The reason for choosing such a setting is
twofold: First, there is clear and strong empirical evidence suggesting that in reality parties
care about policies as well as about winning elections and that party platforms do never fully
converge (cf. the discussions in Roemer, 1998, 1999). Second, Downsian or probabilistic
voting models with converging political platforms either preclude non-informed voters or
imply irrational voters as the non-informed voters could simply solve the model.7
We assume that parties value policies according to the same utility function U as voters.
6One objection to the assumption of Knightian uncertainty is that uninformed voters could learn the
party types yL and yR from observing the political outcomes of past elections. In a companion paper, Lind
and Rohner (2011), we consider an extended version of the current model where there are different candidates
running for each party at each election. This introduces uncertainty about the preferences of the currently
running candidate and hence resolves this problem. The conclusions are virtually unchanged, but the model
becomes more involved.
7This is for instance a drawback of Stro¨mberg’s (2004a,b) model. He builds a probabilistic voting model
where voters care about the policies implemented and have some randomly distributed preferences over
personal characteristics of the candidates. As all aspects of the model (besides the platforms) are common
knowledge, the uninformed voters face the same information set as the parties and should accordingly be
able to work out what platforms the parties will choose. Stro¨mberg (2004b: 269) is aware of this problem
and solves it by assuming that “each voter i is uncertain about how useful the publicly provided services are
to the other voters (...). They know the continuous distribution from which these parameters are drawn, but
not the realized values. This makes the voters unable to solve for the unique political equilibrium spending
levels (...)”. However, for this argument to have any major impact on policy outcomes, the electorate has
to be very small. Given the law of large numbers, even in modest electorates the theoretical distribution of
voters is a close approximation of the realized outcome.
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Specifically, the parties have political positions corresponding to the income levels yL and
yR, respectively.
8 They simultaneously propose platforms τL, τR ∈ [0, 1] with commitment.
We assume that yL and yR are such that party L chooses a policy to the left of the utilitarian
maximum and R a policy to the right, i.e.
τR < arg max
τ
∫ +∞
0
U(τ, y) dF (y) < τL. (1)
Voters then vote sincerely for their preferred party, and the party with the largest number
of votes takes office and implements its proposed policy.
Platform τL is chosen to maximize
P (τL, τR) [U (τL, yL) + Z] + [1− P (τL, τR)]U (τR, yL) , (2)
where P (τL, τR) is the probability of party L winning the election for the given set of
platforms and Z ≥ 0 are rents from being in office. An analogue expression holds for party
R. Assuming that P is differentiable (which will be shown below), the chosen platform
satisfies the first order condition:
∂P (τL, τR)
∂τL
[U (τL, yL)− U (τR, yL) + Z] = −P (τL, τR) ∂U (τL, yL)
∂τL
. (3)
This implies that the chosen platform is a trade-off between the politician’s preferred policy
and the policy that maximizes the probability of winning the election.
2.3 Voting behavior
Voters are assumed to care about policies τ and the popularity or valence of the politician,
which is in line with the probabilistic voting literature (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). After
announcing their policies, politicians receive an aggregate popularity shock δ and idiosyn-
cratic taste shocks σi. This assumption guarantees continuity and differentiability of the
election probability P . In particular, the aggregate popularity shock δ captures R’s relative
popularity and is assumed to have mean zero and a symmetric distribution with cdf H.
Moreover, we make the technical assumption that H is log concave, i.e. that h(δ)
H(δ)
, with
h(δ) = H ′(δ), is decreasing in δ. Most commonly used distributions, such as the normal or
the uniform, have log concave cdf – see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for a more complete
list and discussion of log concave distributions. The individual shocks σi, capturing the
relative taste for R, have a symmetric distribution centered around zero and cdf S.
A voter with income yi is informed with probability pi(yi). When informed, voters vote
8The income yi could be seen as the candidates’ true income in a citizen-candidate framework (Besley
and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinsky, 1998) or more generally as an identity the party takes upon itself.
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for the platform which best satisfies their preferences. An informed voter with income yi
then votes L if U (τL, yi) > U (τR, yi) + δ + σi. Thus, a share S[U (τL, y) − U (τR, y) − δ] of
voters with income y vote L.
From the single crossing property it follows that for given proposed platforms, δ, and
σi, there is a threshold income where everybody with income below votes L and everybody
above votes R. Hence, S[U (τL, y)− U (τR, y)− δ] is decreasing in y. Finally, the number of
votes party L receives from informed voters is given by
V I(τL, τR, δ) =
∫ +∞
0
S[U (τL, y)− U (τR, y)− δ]pi(y) dF (y). (4)
With probability 1−pi(y), a voter is uninformed and receives no signal about the parties’
platforms. As beliefs about positions have been assumed away, it follows that their vote
is not affected by their private economic situation, only by the random popularity of the
parties δ and an individual taste shock σi. Hence, the number of votes party L receives from
non-informed voters is
V NI(δ) = S(−δ)
∫ +∞
0
[1− pi(y)] dF (y). (5)
To summarize the results on individual voting decisions:
Proposition 1 Informed voters with an income below some threshold vote L, while those
with an income above this threshold vote R. The vote of uninformed voters does not depend
on their incomes, but only on the aggregate popularity shock δ and idiosyncratic taste shocks
σi.
Income affects voting behavior, both by making voters less favorable to redistribution,
and by increasing the probability of the voter being informed.
Corollary 1 i) Overall, voters with a higher income have a greater probability of voting for
right wing parties. ii) The effect of income on voting is stronger if a given voter has greater
political knowledge (as this increases the likelihood of being “informed”).
2.4 Political equilibrium
We are now ready to study the political equilibrium. Party L’s total vote share is V I(τL, τR, δ)+
V NI(δ). There is a critical level δˆ(τL, τR) such that L wins if and only if the observed δ < δˆ.
This critical level is found as the solution to
V I(τL, τR, δˆ) + V
NI(δˆ) = 1/2. (6)
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The effect of a change in the proposed tax rate on this critical level is given by
∂δˆ
∂τL
= − V
I
τL
V Iδ + V
NI
δ
=
∫ +∞
0
∂U
∂τL
µ(y) dF (y),
where subscripts denote partial derivatives, and the weighting function µ is defined by
µ(y) =
s
[
U (τL, y)− U (τR, y)− δˆ
]
pi(y)∫ +∞
0
(s[U (τL, y)− U (τR, y)− δ]pi(y) + s(−δ)[1− pi(y)]) dF (y)
≥ 0, (7)
where s is the first derivative (i.e. the pdf) of S.
Note first that for the average voter ∂U/∂τL < 0 in the relevant range of τL (i.e. for τL
being somewhere between the social optimum and L’s bliss point). Further, notice that for a
given income, the numerator of equation (7) is the responsiveness of the vote share stemming
from utility changes due to tax changes. The denominator is an adjustment yielding the effect
of the critical value δˆ on the vote share.
Party L’s probability of winning the election is
P (τL, τR) = Pr
[
δ < δˆ(τL, τR)
]
= H[δˆ(τL, τR)], (8)
and we have
∂P (τL, τR)
∂τL
= h[δˆ(τL, τR)]
∫ +∞
0
∂U
∂τL
µ(y) dF (y). (9)
where h is the first derivative (i.e. the pdf) of H, and µ is as defined in equation (7).
A change in party L’s platform affects voting behavior in all income groups. There are
three factors that affect how much the changed behavior in each group affects overall winning
probabilities: How much the group’s utility is changed by the change in platform, given by
∂U
∂τL
, the group’s leverage on δˆ given by µ(y), and finally the group’s size.
This implies that when politicians consider the effect on their winning prospects of a
change in platform, they ultimately only respond to a “listening” electorate with incomes
distributed according to µ (y) f (y). As we see below, when pi is increasing in y, this implies
that parties put more weight on voters from the upper part of the income distribution than
under uniformly distributed information.
Rearranging equation (3) we find that the optimal choice of τL satisfies
−∂P (τL, τR)
∂τL
τL
P (τL, τR)
=
∂U(τL, yL)
∂τL
τL
U (τL, yL)− U (τR, yL) + Z . (10)
The left hand side of the expression corresponds to the effect of a policy change on the
probability of winning the election whereas the right hand side represents the utility gain of
the politician of changing the policy. We see that the optimal policy is where the elasticity
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of the winning probability with regard to the policy equals that of the party’s utility gain.
Interestingly, as the support from the uninformed voters does not depend on the actual
platforms selected, they will be treated as a constant by the parties. Thus, despite the addi-
tional uncertainty in our model, the optimization decision of the parties becomes analogous
to the one in the framework of Wittman (1983). Hence, his proof of existence of a Nash
equilibrium (1983: 154f) also applies to our setting. Besides for non-generic special cases
this framework always features some platform divergence.
2.5 The distribution of information
To see the effect of unevenly distributed information, a natural benchmark is the case where
pi(y) = 1, so that all voters are informed. This corresponds to the classic Wittman (1983)
model and is an implicit assumption in most electoral models. Compare it first to a situ-
ation where only some voters are informed, but where the probability of being informed is
independent of income, i.e. pi(y) = pi0. Label the left hand side of (10 ) EP . This is the
elasticity of the winning probability with regard to the proposed platform. If EP decreases,
it means that party L has a better position and can to a larger extent choose a policy it
desires itself, i.e. a higher tax rate τL. Combining (8) and (9), we obtain
EP = −∂P (τL, τR)
∂τL
τL
P (τL, τR)
= −τL h(δˆ)
H(δˆ)
∫ +∞
0
∂U
∂τL
µ(y) dF (y), (11)
where as before µ(y) is given by equation (7).
At pi0 = 0, i.e. with no informed voters, we see that EP = 0, so party L chooses τL to
maximize their own utility without any attention paid to voters. Similarly, party R chooses
their platform to maximize their own utility.
At pi0 = 1, the weight µ(y) > 0, which means that voters are taken into account. At
party L’s bliss point, we have EP > 0 as by assumption this policy is above the one preferred
by the average voter (i.e. ∂U/∂τL < 0 for most voters). Hence party L’s proposed platform
is closer to the average preferred policy than when pi0 = 0.
Although EP > 0 for all pi0 > 0, it is not necessarily maximized at pi0 = 1. The reason
for this is that an increase in pi0 changes δˆ, increasing it if a majority of formerly uninformed
voters decide to vote L when they get informed9 and vice versa. This may in itself improve L’s
position (increase P (τL, τR)) enough that it can move back towards its bliss point. However,
as only one party can have its position improved, at least one of the parties chooses a less
polarized platform for a higher pi0. See Appendix A.2 for further discussion of this. To
summarize, we obtain the following Proposition:
9Whether this is the case depends on yL, yR, the utility function, as well as the exact shape of F . A
derivation of sufficient conditions for this to be true is outside the scope of the present paper.
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Proposition 2 When some voters are uninformed, but information is unrelated to income
levels, at least one of the parties’ policy becomes more “polarized” than with perfect informa-
tion, i.e. further away from the social optimum.
Let us now introduce a probability of being informed that is increasing in income. Con-
sider the effect of making some poor informed voters non-informed and the same number of
rich non-informed voters informed. We do this by perturbating the pi function, and hence the
fraction of informed voters with income y is pi(y) + αν(y) where ν(y) ≤ 0 for y below some
threshold and ν(y) ≥ 0 for y above. The total number of informed voters is kept unchanged,
i.e.
∫ +∞
0
ν(y) dF (y) = 0.
The following lemma shows that for a small perturbation party L chooses a more right
wing platform:
Lemma 1 EP is increasing in α.
The proof is given in Appendix A.3. There are two effects: First, the critical value δˆ
goes down as the group of informed rich voters generally favoring party R increases. This
weakens L’s position, which consequently pays less attention to own preferences in the aim of
regaining popularity. Second, the weight µ(y) changes, placing more emphasis on rich voters.
Both these effects induce L to propose a more right wing platform. The same two forces
also make party R move its platform to the right. To summarize, we obtain the following
Proposition:
Proposition 3 When some voters are uninformed, the more information depends on in-
come, the more right wing the platforms of each of the parties become.
This has the following empirically testable implication:
Corollary 2 The higher the correlation between income and information, the less redistribu-
tive are the platforms of both parties.
3 Information and voting behavior
3.1 Data
To test the predictions of the model we use data from the American National Election
Studies, containing information from individual interviews from 1960 to 2004. First we
use a number of indicators of how well informed the respondent is about public policy in
general and the electoral campaign in particular. We have 3-points and 4-points scales on
how interested the respondent is in the election and in public affairs in general and binary
10
variables on whether she followed the campaign on TV, on radio, and in the newspapers. A
factor analysis of these indicators reveals that there is a single very strong factor, pointing
out the scope for data reduction. Therefore, we use a principal component analysis to reduce
the five indicators to a single indicator of how informed the respondent is, which is the main
indicator of information used in the analysis.
To measure political behavior we mostly rely on voting in presidential elections as this is
perfectly comparable across states, although we also analyze voting in congressional elections
in some robustness checks. We only consider voting for the two major parties in order
to assure comparability over time. Further, data on the respondent’s stand on a number
of policy issues as well as the usual vector of background variables are included. A full
description of the data is provided in Appendix B.1, and Appendix C provides descriptive
statistics.
3.2 Who are informed?
Assumption 2 implies that more educated voters with higher income are better informed
about politics than those with less education and lower income. To check if this holds, Table
1 displays the results from estimations where the indicators of being politically informed
are regressed on income and education, as well as on a vector of explanatory variables and
year and state dummies. We first use the five individual indicators of being informed, then
the composite measure from the principal component analysis with and without state fixed
effects.
For all specifications we obtain the expected result that voters with higher income and
more education tend to be better informed. These results are in most cases significant at
the 1% level. Moving from the lowest to the highest level of education increases the level of
information by 1.07 standard deviations whereas an increase from the lowest to the highest
income category increases information by 0.37 standard deviations.10
3.3 Income and voting
The core of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 is that income is a better predictor of voting
behavior for more informed voters than for less informed voters. A simple way to test
this is to regress observed voting on the interaction of income and information, obviously
also controlling for background variables. Results from this estimation are shown in Table
2. Columns (1) and (2) display the results from a probit model without and with state
fixed effects, while Column (3) presents the results from an ordinary regression on a binary
outcome variable. All methods confirm that a rise in income increases the probability of
10Both results are based on the numbers in Column (7) of Table 1.
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Table 2: The effect of income and being informed on Republican voting
President Congress
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income 0.0943*** 0.106*** 0.0371*** 0.0999***
(6.28) (6.92) (6.93) (6.94)
Informed -0.103*** -0.0951*** -0.0335*** -0.0638**
(-3.26) (-2.99) (-3.06) (-2.10)
Income*Informed 0.0278*** 0.0245** 0.00861** 0.0171*
(2.83) (2.46) (2.51) (1.84)
Model Probit Probit OLS Probit
State FE No Yes Yes Yes
Fit 0.102 0.116 0.126 0.0957
N 9723 9715 9722 11139
Notes: Equations (1), (2) and (4) are probit estimations, equation (3) an ordinary regression. All specifica-
tions include age, age squared, sex, race, 7 dummies on educational level, and year dummies. Specifications
(1), (3) and (4) also have state fixed effects. “Fit” is McFadden’s goodness of fit-measure ρ2 for the probits
and R2 for the OLS regression. t-values are in parentheses, and *, **, and *** denotes significant at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
voting republican, and this effect is stronger for the more informed than for the less informed
voters. Going from the 25th to the 75th percentile on the level of information increases
the coefficient on income in the specification in Column (2) from 0.138 to 0.171, which
corresponds to about a 24% increase in the impact. The results for voting for Congress
reported in Column (4) are somewhat weaker, but similar in sign and magnitude.
Another way to study this pattern is to split the sample between voters with high and
low levels of information. Results from this approach are reported in Table 3, where we have
estimated a probit model with a number of demographic characteristics for the least and
most informed halves of the sample. Most of the demographics have fairly similar effects in
both specifications, but we notice again that income is a much more important determinant
of voting for the more informed part of the sample, both with and without state fixed effects.
One competing explanation for these findings could be that what we label less informed
voters could simply be voters who have larger social concerns, and hence vote less according
to own needs. In Appendix D we show that if we take voting according to social preferences
into account, less informed voters still vote less according to their stated preferences.
3.4 Voting versus abstention
As highlighted by e.g. Larcinese (2005, 2007), there are both theoretical reasons and empir-
ical support for the tendency of less informed voters to abstain more often from elections. It
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Figure 1: Simulation of the effect at the intensive and extensive margin
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Year
Notes: The simulation is based on the estimates reported in Column (1) of Table 2. The
solid line is the simulated percentage point gain for the Democratic party from no voters
abstaining; the dashed line is the simulated percentage point gain for the Democratic party
from all voters having the maximum level of information.
might be that this effect completely overshadows our mechanism. To study this, we conduct
a simulation based on the estimates from Column (1) in Table 2. We simulate the outcome
of elections in two cases: First, if all voters had voted, where the voting pattern of those
abstaining is predicted from the regression. Second, if all voters had the maximum level of
information, again predicting voting behavior. The results are presented in Figure 1. We
see that the gain for the Democratic party from all citizens voting is about 1.5 percentage
points whereas the effect of the changed voting pattern from all voters being informed is
somewhat smaller, at about one percentage point. Still, the effects of both channels are of
approximately the same order of magnitude.
4 Information and political outcomes
Our theory predicts that when there is a strong positive correlation between income and
the level of information, this reduces the equilibrium level of public goods provision. To get
a grasp of the macro level effects of information, we study in this section the relationship
between how information is spread and various political outcomes. All the data is described
in detail in Appendix B.2.
15
Figure 2: Relationship between income and information by US state
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Notes: Bars depict the average correlation between level of information and income by state.
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Using the ANES data employed earlier, we can compute the correlation between the
variables Informed and Income state by state and for various years.1112 The average corre-
lations by state are shown in Figure 2. One approach would be to associate these with state
policies. However, most redistributive policies are determined at the federal level, so state
level policies tend to be uninformative. Instead, we focus on voting behavior in the House
and the Senate.
In Table 4 we analyze whether a stronger correlation between information and income
leads to less redistributive platforms for both Democrats and Republicans, as predicted by
Corollary 2. It is not easy to get exact measures of voting behavior on redistributive issues
completely isolated from all other issues. Instead, we rely on standard measures of political
orientation, namely McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal’s (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; McCarty,
Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) NOMINATE scores estimated from actual voting behavior as
well as the scores collected by Americans For Democratic Action (ADA). These capture
the political orientation of all Congress members from both parties. Right-wing political
platforms are reflected by high NOMINATE scores and low ADA scores. Our final dependent
variable is the tax share of personal income, which is a direct measure of how redistributive
the final policy is. In Table 4 the coefficients of the variable Correlation income-information
are displayed in three different panels. In panel A no additional controls are included, in
panel B a battery of controls are included, and in panel C the same controls are included,
together with state fixed effects.
Panel A of Table 4 shows that states with a high correlation between income and informa-
tion do have more conservative representatives both measured by the NOMINATE and the
ADA scores, and their tax share of personal income is lower than in states where this corre-
lation is weaker. These findings are robust to including our battery of control variables. The
findings using the NOMINATE scores are also robust to controlling for state fixed effects,
but the ADA and tax share results are no longer significant when we only consider within
state variation. This indicates that the findings are mostly driven by differences between
states, although within state changes also have some effects on the political position of rep-
resentatives. This pattern may be due to the fact that the correlation between information
and income is rather persistent and evolves only slowly over time.
11ANES does not sample respondents in every state, hence some states are missing. Also, excluding states
with few observations does not qualitatively change the results reported below.
12We have also tried to use the General Social Survey (GSS) to calculate these correlations. However,
the best measure of information available in the GSS is frequency of newspaper readership, so this is less
satisfactory. The results are comparable, but slightly less robust.
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Table 4: Aggregate policy outcomes
NOMINATE ADA Tax shares
A No controls 0.0907** -11.27*** -0.627**
(2.27) (-2.73) (-2.60)
R2 0.0541 0.163 0.0600
B Controls 0.0932** -8.260* -0.445*
(2.24) (-2.00) (-1.99)
R2 0.303 0.412 0.319
C Fixed effects 0.0466* -1.355 -0.133
(1.68) (-0.56) (-1.03)
R2 0.252 0.327 0.259
N 457 457 457
Notes: The first row in each panel corresponds to the coefficient for the variable Correlation
income-information. The following control variables are included: In Panel A Information,
Income, and time effects. In Panel B all control variables of Panel A and in addition
Personal Income, State population, Growth of personal income, Political competition, Share
of non-farm income, Average Democratic vote share in the state. In Panel C all control
variables from Panel B are included, but in addition state fixed effects. t-values clustered at
the state level are in parentheses and *, **, and *** denotes significant at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has argued that “knowledge is power”. Poorly informed voters do not perceive
the party platforms correctly, and accordingly do not vote in their best economic interest.
Such “noise voters” are disregarded by both the government and opposition, as they do not
react to concessions and platform changes. Hence, the preferences of whole segments of the
population remain ignored.
Whether the parties’ strategic ignorance of the uninformed is a problem for a democracy
depends on how information is spread in the society. If in all income classes and ethnic
groups the proportion of poorly informed voters is roughly similar, we should not expect too
severe biases in policies. Lack of information may in this case simply lead to more polarized
party platforms, with parties putting a relatively higher weight on their preferred bliss point,
given that pandering to voters is less lucrative if fewer people perceive it.
If however lack of political information strikes particularly the poor or people from par-
ticular ethnic groups, it could become a serious problem. In many contexts this is the case.
Higher education results on average in higher income, and at the same time makes it easier
to access and process political information. Hence, income and information tend to be sys-
tematically correlated, in some cases more and in some cases less. In societies where almost
only the rich know about politics the preferences of the poor “noise voters” are barely taken
into account by the political establishment and policies are catered towards the thin elite of
the population who follows politics. Accordingly, the state becomes less redistributive and
policies of all parties become more harmful to the poor. In societies with a smaller correlation
between income and political information this bias is less severe. The mechanism would be
similar for some ethnic minority group that may for various reasons be less informed about
politics.
The irony of this is that the people who are most in need of the protection of the state,
i.e. the uneducated ones with poor jobs, are least heard and accounted for by all parties
(including the left-wing ones). The natural normative question to ask is whether the state
should intervene to change this. One point of view could be that the poor are themselves
to blame if they do not get their act together and if they “disenfranchise” themselves by
lacking interest in politics. Things seem however more complex. The bias from badly
informed poor voters may well end up being self-reinforcing and becoming persistent. In
societies where knowledge is spread very unevenly it may well be that the thin elite who
dominates politics may not find it in their interest to build a costly system of good state
schools, as they can afford to send their children to expensive private schools. This however
reinforces the correlation between income and information in the following generation and
the concentration of political power in the hands of the few accentuates. In contrast, in
other societies political knowledge may initially be widely spread and available and the large
19
influence of the poor may promote large investments in high-quality public schooling, which
generates a further democratization of knowledge. What seems certain is that there is plenty
of scope for further research on this and related topics in the future.
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Appendix A Extensions and proofs
A.1 A formal model of political information
We consider a continuum of voters differentiated by their stock of human capital Ei. Each
voter i has a utility function
Ui = xi + ξdi + J(g), (A-1)
where xi is voter i’s amount of private goods, di her level of political knowledge, and g the
amount of public goods provided in society. The function J is assumed to be concave and
increasing (i.e. Jg > 0 and Jgg < 0), and ξ > 0 is a parameter indicating how much citizens
value information. As in standard political economics models (e.g. Persson and Tabellini,
2000) the voters’ utility depends positively on both the private and public goods consumed.
Here we also include the level of political knowledge of the voter.
The voter has an income yi that is taxed at a rate τ . Post tax income is divided between
consumption and investments into information acquisition si (e.g. cost of buying books and
magazines, the opportunity cost of watching the news etc), yielding a budget constraint
(1− τ)yi = xi + si. (A-2)
Voter i’s income is given by the production function
yi = f(Ei), (A-3)
which is increasing in Ei. Finally, we represent the generation of political knowledge by
di = κ(si, Ei), (A-4)
where we assume κs > 0 and κss < 0. We also assume that human capital and investments
in political knowledge are complementary, i.e. κsE > 0.
The citizens make their optimal choices of s∗i and g
∗
i at the beginning of the first pe-
riod. These choices are independent of the actions in the remainder of the game. Inserting
equations (A-2) and (A-4) into equation (A-1), and using the government budget constraint
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g = τy, where y = average income, we obtain the objective function for the citizens to
optimize:
U i = (y − g)yi
y
+ ξκ(si, Ei)− si + J(g). (A-5)
The first order conditions with respect to si lead to lemma 2. The second order conditions
hold.
Lemma 2 More educated citizens have greater incentives to invest income in the generation
of political knowledge, i.e. they have a higher si. They acquire higher levels of political
knowledge than less educated citizens, i.e. they achieve a higher di.
This result follows from κsE > 0.
Thus, education does not only increase income, but also results in higher levels of political
knowledge acquired. Furthermore, each citizen derives her preferred level of g∗i . Maximizing
(A-5) with regard to g, we find the preferred level of public goods g∗ characterized by
g∗i = J
−1
g
(
yi
y
)
(A-6)
Lemma 3 Richer voters (i.e. with higher yi) prefer lower levels of the public good (i.e.
lower g∗i ).
The concavity of J(•) implies that equation (A-6) directly leads to this result (cf. Persson
and Tabellini (2000) for a further discussion).
Combining these two lemmata, we can describe the relationship between preferred policies
and political knowledge by a function d∗ (g∗), where d∗ must be decreasing in g∗. High
individual benefits from redistribution are on average associated with low levels of political
information.
A.2 Increased information
To study the effect of increased information, we differentiate (11) with regard to pi0:
∂EP
∂pi0
= −τL
∫ +∞
0
∂U
∂τL
∂ h(δˆ)H(δˆ)
∂δˆ
∂δˆ
∂pi0
µ(y) +
h(δˆ)
H(δˆ)
∂µ(y)
∂pi0
 dF (y). (A-7)
There are two effects of an increase in pi0, corresponding to the two terms in parenthesis .
First, more voters become aware of the parties’ platforms and hence make a judgment based
on their policy preferences. This has an effect on the critical δˆ, and corresponds to the first
part of the parenthesis. The sign of this effect is unclear. δˆ is increasing in pi0 if the average
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voter tends to vote L when she goes from uninformed to informed.13 When this is the case,
an increased information level is an advantage for party L and a disadvantage for R.
Second, when more voters are informed, a change in policy platforms has a larger impact
on voting behavior, corresponding to the last part of the parenthesis. As µ(y) is unambigu-
ously increasing in pi0 for all y, this effect increases EP . If the second effect dominates, an
increase in the fraction of informed voters pi0 tends to increase EP and hence make both
parties less polarized. If the first effect dominates, the party gaining in popularity from
increased information can use its improved position to propose a platform closer to its bliss
point, whereas the other party proposes a platform closer to the centre.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
We obtain
∂EP
∂α
= −τL
∂ h(δˆ)H(δˆ)
∂δˆ
∂δˆ
∂α
∫ +∞
0
∂U
∂τL
µ(y) dF (y)− τL h(δˆ)
H(δˆ)
∫ +∞
0
∂U
∂τL
∂µ(y)
∂α
dF (y).
As we can always redefine pi(y) = pi(y) + αν(y), it suffices to show that the lemma holds at
α = 0. We have
∂δˆ
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣
α=0
=
∫ +∞
0
(
S
[
U (τL, y)− U (τR, y)− δˆ
]
− S
(
−δˆ
))
ν(y) dF (y)
∫ +∞
0
(
s
[
U (τL, y)− U (τR, y)− δˆ
]
pi(y) + s(−δˆ)[1− pi(y)]
)
dF (y)
< 0.
This expression is negative, as S
[
U (τL, y)− U (τR, y)− δˆ
]
− S
(
−δˆ
)
is positive for low
income voters on which ν puts negative weight, and negative for high income voters on
which ν puts positive weight.14 Given that ∂
(
h(δˆ)
H(δˆ)
)
/∂δˆ < 0, and that for the average voter
∂U/∂τL < 0, we know that the first term of ∂EP/∂α is always positive.
A second effect is through changes in the weighting µ. The effect of a minor perturbation
on µ depends on y: If for some y∗ there is ∂µ(y
∗)
∂α
∣∣∣
α=0
> 0 then it is also positive for all y > y∗
and vice versa. Hence more weight is now put on wealthier voters and less on poorer voters.
Hence, also the second term of ∂EP/∂α is always positive. Party L will thus unambiguously
select a less polarized platform. For the same reasons also R will move to the right.
13Which is whenever
∫ +∞
0
(
S[U (τL, y)− U (τR, y)− δ]− S[−δ]
)
dF (y) > 0.
14If S
[
U (τL, y)− U (τR, y)− δˆ
]
− S
(
−δˆ
)
is positive for all y for which ν(y) 6= 0 the result is unchanged,
as by assumption it is more positive when ν(y) is negative and vice versa.
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Appendix B Data
B.1 Data used in Section 3
All data are from the American National Election Studies (2010).
African American: This is 1 when “race” is “black” and 0 otherwise, based on observation
and/or self-declaration.
Age: Answer to question about date of birth.
Education: Answer to question about the highest degree earned. There are seven cate-
gories: 1) 8 grades or less (’grade school’), 2) 9-12 grades (’high school’), no diploma/equivalency,
3) 12 grades, diploma or equivalency, 4) 12 grades, diploma or equivalency plus non-
academic training, 5) Some college, no degree; junior/community college level degree
(AA degree), 6) BA level degrees, 7) Advanced degrees incl. LLB.
Female: Takes a value of 1 if female, 0 otherwise.
Followed campaign on newspapers: Answer to the question “Did you read about the
campaign in any newspaper?”. Takes value of 1 if answered “Yes, read newspaper(s)
about the campaign”, takes value of 0 if answered “No, read no newspapers about the
campaign”.
Followed campaign on radio: Answer to the question “Did you listen to any speeches
or discussions about the campaign on the radio?”. Yes=1, No=0.
Followed campaign on TV: Answer to the question “Did you watch any programs about
the campaigns on television?”. Yes=1, No=0.
Income: Based on self-declaration. There are five income groups: 1) 0 to 16 percentile, 2)
17 to 33 percentile, 3) 34 to 67 percentile, 4) 68 to 95 percentile, 5) 96 to 100 percentile.
Informed: Composite measure obtained from principal component analysis, explained in
section 3.2.
Interest in campaign: Answer to question “Some people don’t pay much attention to
political campaigns. How about you, would you say that you have been/were very much
interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in the political campaigns (so
far) this year?”. Three categories of answers: 1) Not much interested, 2) Somewhat
interested, 3) Very much interested.
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Interest in public affairs: Answer to the question “Would you say you follow what’s
going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only
now and then, or hardly at all?”. Four categories of answers: 1) Hardly at all (1960,
1962: not much at all), 2) Only now and then, 3) Some of the time (1960, 1962: fairly
closely), 4) Most of the time (1960, 1962: very closely).
Other non-white race: This is 1 when “race” is “other” and 0 otherwise, based on ob-
servation and/or self-declaration.
Voted republican for Congress: Answer to the question “Did you vote for a candidate
for the U.S. House of Representatives? (IF YES:) Who did you vote for?”. Republi-
can=1, Democrat=0.
Voted republican for President: Answer to the question “Major party presidential vote
(2 party)”. Republican=1, Democrat=0.
B.2 Data used in Section 4
ADA: Adjusted ADA scores, from Anderson and Habel (2009).
Average Democratic vote share in the state: From Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010).
Correlation income-information: Correlation between Income and Information, as de-
scribed in the main text.
Election results: Actual results from elections. From Leip (2010).
Growth of personal income: From Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010).
Income: From ANES, cf. above.
Information: From ANES, cf. above.
NOMINATE: Data taken from Keith Poole’s web page http://voteview.com. Procedure
documented in McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (1997).
Personal income: From Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010).
Political competition: Measure of political competition, from Besley, Persson and Sturm
(2010).
Share of non-farm income: From Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010).
State population: From Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010).
27
Tax share: Taxes paid as share of personal income, from Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010).
Voted Republican for President: From ANES, cf. above.
Appendix C Descriptive statistics
Table A-1: Descriptive statistics
All Democrat Republican
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 45.76 17.15 17 99 46.70 16.51 47.30 16.32
Age squared 2388 1718 289 9801 2453 1664 2503 1657
Female 0.56 0.50 0 1 0.57 0.50 0.53 0.50
African American 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.17 0.37 0.02 0.13
Other non-white 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.19
Income
Group 1 0.17 0.38 0 1 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.30
Group 2 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.35
Group 3 0.32 0.47 0 1 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46
Group 4 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.30 0.46 0.35 0.48
Group 5 0.06 0.23 0 1 0.04 0.21 0.10 0.30
Education
8 grades or less 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.16 0.37 0.11 0.32
9-12 grades 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.14 0.34 0.11 0.31
12 grades + diploma 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.41
12 grades, diploma, and training 0.08 0.28 0 1 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31
Some college 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.41
BA 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.38
Advanced degree 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.23
Interest in the election 2.04 0.75 1 3 2.26 0.71 2.27 0.70
Interest in public affairs 2.78 1.02 1 4 2.94 0.94 3.03 0.92
Followed campaign on TV 0.77 0.42 0 1 0.87 0.34 0.86 0.35
Followed campaign on radio 0.44 0.50 0 1 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.50
Followed campaign in newspapers 0.69 0.46 0 1 0.77 0.42 0.79 0.41
Informed 0.00 1.46 -3.56 2.08 0.38 1.26 0.47 1.22
Voted republican for Congress 0.44 0.50 0 1 0.14 0.35 0.74 0.44
Voted republican for President 0.52 0.50 0 1
Appendix D Taste variation and the level of
information in a spatial model of voting
One explanation for the findings in Section 3.3 could be that what we label less informed
voters could simply be voters who have larger social concerns, and hence vote less according
to own needs. To test this, an extension of Proposition 1 would be that personal political
position is a better predictor of voting behavior for more informed voters. To test this, we
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assume that the voter and the two parties R and D are located in a policy space. The voter’s
position is gi and the parties are located at g
R and gD. Voter i will vote for party R if he is
closer to R than to D. To capture nonpolitical effects, we also introduce stochastic terms ε,
so he votes R if ∥∥gi − gR∥∥+ σiεRi < ∥∥gi − gD∥∥+ σiεDi . (A-8)
where ‖·‖ is some metric on the policy space15. We interpret a low value of σi as the level
of information being high. To estimate this relationship, we employ a reduced form where
we estimate that the probability of voting Republican is
Pr(Vote Republican) = Pr (β′gi + σiεi)
where βt is a time specific vector incorporating the relevant position of the parties. The
variance is modeled as
lnσ2i = γtIi (A-9)
where Ii corresponds to i’s level of information. Assuming that ε
A
i − εBi ∼ N (0, 1), we can
estimate the parameters of the model using a heteroskedastic probit model.
The interesting parameter here is γt, which gives the relationship between information
and voting behavior. A negative γt indicates that the variance is lower for the more informed
voters, and that their voting pattern is better predicted by stated political preferences, which
we can take as an extension of Proposition 1. The results are reported in Table A-2. Note
that γt is negative for all years studied but two. As the estimates are not very precise, we have
also made a joint estimate, i.e. where we assume γ constant over time. This joint coefficient
is negative and clearly significantly different from zero.16 Hence one’s policy position has a
more consistent impact on voting behavior for the more informed voters than for the less
informed voters, which is in line with Proposition 1.
15Notice that this is not necessarily an Euclidean metric. Particularly, it may be reasonable to put more
emphasis on distance in some dimensions than in others.
16The constraint that γ is equal between years changes the estimates of the upper part of the table as well
(not displayed). The p-value for the constrained estimate is based on a LR test of γ = 0.
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Table A-2: Political position and voting in a model of individual-specific variances
Year γ Z-value Observations
1960 -0.053 -0.42 526
1964 -0.0592 -0.70 431
1968 0.0168 -0.13 358
1972 -0.102 -1.18 355
1976 -0.289** -2.51 357
1980 -0.222** -2.12 358
1984 0.0325 -0.22 278
1992 -0.0741 -0.56 312
1996 -0.0248 -0.36 557
2000 -0.633*** -2.62 162
2004 -0.0595 -0.71 478
All years -0.104*** [.0005565]
Notes: All estimations are heteroskedastic probits with year specific parameters. The param-
eter “Common γ” is a joint maximum likelihood estimation with γ constrained to be equal
for all years. z-values are in parentheses and p-values in square brackets, and *, **, and ***
denotes significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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